Italy And Libya Agreement

[82]. Human Rights Watch, “Human Rights in Libya,” New Statesman, January 14, 2008, hrw.org/english/docs/2008/01/14/libya17732.htm. Matteo Villa, a migration researcher at ISPI, points out that the agreement is not legally binding and that it only sets out a few existing policies, such as cooperation with the Libyan Coast Guard, which began in 2016, and an informal pact with armed groups to prevent emigration. The critical point here is that the Libyan tendency towards informality with Italy has been a relative price for the Jamahiriya. Criticism from the international community has relatively reduced the real improvement in its international status, from which Libya hoped to benefit from the agreements. While the flights were managed and funded by the Italian government, Libya`s support for these practices was seen as confirmation of its bad human rights reputation. For example, the protests against Qhadafi during his visit to France in December 2007 were due to the regime`s general practice of repatriation and, more generally, its ongoing human rights violations. [82] As a result, the regime`s approval of return flights may have had negative consequences for its overall foreign policy agenda. However, in the broad sense of the political term, it can be argued that the ambiguity of the agreements and the criticism of Libya in the area of human rights have not had a significant influence on Libya`s behaviour on migration and general foreign policy interests. The new agreement between Italy and the Libyan Coast Guard entered into force on Sunday for a period of three years.

With the support of the European Union, it will continue to financially support Libya to train the Libyan Coast Guard in migrant rescue operations. [85] Frontex, “Frontex-Led EU Illegal Immigration Technical Mission to Libya,” May 28-June 5, 2007 (Warsaw: Frontex, 2007), pp. 13-15, www.statewatch.org/news/2007/oct/eu-libya-frontex-report.pdf. In addition, the informality of the agreements has created an additional obstacle to Italian action. Indeed, the Italian Government has been asked to justify the agreements before numerous international organisations. In March 2006, Italy likely halted its return flights due to increasing international pressure. The short-term benefits of reducing undocumented migrants have been outpaced by the cost of justifying ambiguous and controversial removal policies. Simply put, reputation costs[87], due to the dubious nature of the agreements, have become too high. This could explain the abrupt change in policy under the Berlusconi government, confirmed by the Prodi government that followed. . .

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